Readings

SES # READINGS
Part I: De Se Thought
1

Perry, John. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."The Problem of the Essential Indexical." (PDF - 4.8MB) Nous 13, no. 1 (1979): 3–21. (Blackwell Publishing)

Lewis, David. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."Attitudes De Dicto and De Se." (PDF - 1.9MB) The Philosophical Review 88, no. 4 (1979): 513–43. (Duke University Press)
2

Anscombe, G. E. M. "The First Person."

Stalnaker, Robert C. "Indexical Belief." Synthese 49, no. 1 (1981): 129–51.

Supplementary Reading

Kripke, Saul. Chapter 10 in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1. Oxford University Press, 2011. ISBN: 9780199730155.

Stalnaker, Robert C. Chapter 3 in Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University Press, 2010. ISBN: 9780199592036.

Campbell, John. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."What Is It to Know What 'I' Refers To?" The Monist 87, no. 2 (2004): 206–18.
3

Cappelen, Herman, and Josh Dever. Chapters 3 and 5 in The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN: 9780199686742. [Preview with Google Books]

Supplementary Reading

Magidor, Ofra. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."The Myth of the De Se." (PDF)

Ninan, Dilip. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes?" (PDF)

Devitt, Michael. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."The Myth of the Problematic De Se." (PDF)
Part II: Propositions
4

Buy at MIT Press Stalnaker, Robert C. Chapter 1 in Inquiry. MIT Press, 1984. ISBN: 9780262192330.

Field, Hartry. "Critical Notice: Stalnaker, Robert - Inquiry." Philosophy of Science 53, no. 3. (1986): 425–48.

Supplementary Reading

Rayo, Agustín. Chapter 4 in The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN: 9780199662623.

Elga, Adam, and Agustín Rayo . "Fragmentation and Information Access."
5

King, Jeffrey C., Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks. Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 12 in New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 32–5, 47–50, 64–70, 72–6, and 91–7. ISBN: 9780199693764. [Preview with Google Books]

Supplementary Reading

Any other sections of the book that interest you.
Part III: Knowing How
6

Stanley, Jason, and Timothy Williamson. "Knowing How." The Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 8 (2001): 411–44.

Noë, Alva. "Against Intellectualism." Analysis 65, no. 288 (2005): 278–90.

Supplementary Reading

Fodor, Jerry A. "The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation." The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 20 (1968): 27–640.

Glick, Ephraim. "Practical Modes of Presentation." Nous 49, no. 3 (2015): 538–59.

———. "Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83, no. 2 (2011): 398–434.
7

Stanley, Jason. Chapter 7 in Know How. Oxford University Press, 2011. ISBN: 9780199695362. [Preview with Google Books]

Rumfitt, Ian. "Savoir Faire." The Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 3 (2003): 158–66.

Supplementary Reading

Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. University Of Chicago Press, 2000. ISBN: 9780226732961. [Preview with Google Books]

Santorio, Paolo. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."Nonfactual Know-How and the Boundaries of Semantics." (PDF)

Snowdon, Paul. "I—Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 104, no. 1 (2004): 1–29.
Part IV: Perceptual Content
8

Logue, Heather. "Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconciliation."

Supplementary Reading

Brewer, Bill. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."How To Account For Illusion." (PDF)

Byrne, Alex. "Experience and Content." The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 236 (2009): 429–51.

Schellenberg, Susanna. "Perceptual Content Defended." Nous 45, no. 4 (2011): 714–50.

Pautz, Adam. "What Are The Contents of Experiences?" The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 236 (2009): 483–507.
9

Speaks, Jeff. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content?" (PDF) The Philosophical Review 114, no. 3 (2005): 359–98.

Van Cleve, James. "Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States." Philosophical Perspectives 26, no. 1 (2012): 411–30.

Supplementary Reading

Byrne, Alex. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."Perception and Conceptual Content." (PDF)
10

McDowell, John. "Lecture III: Non-conceptual Content." In Mind and World. Harvard University Press, 1994. ISBN: 9780674576094. [Preview with Google Books]

———. "Avoiding the Myth of the Given."

Supplementary Reading

Travis, Charles. "The Silences of the Senses." Mind 113, no. 449 (2004): 57–94.
Part V: The Knowledge Argument
11

McDowell, John. "Avoiding the Myth of the Given."

Jackson, Frank. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." The Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (1982): 127–36.

Byrne, Alex, Review of Ludlow, et al. "There's Something About Mary." Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2009.

Rayo, Agustín. Section 4.5 in The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN: 9780199662623.
12

Ball, Derek. This resource may not render correctly in a screen reader."There Are No Phenomenal Concepts." Mind 118, no. 472 (2009): 935–62.

Buy at MIT Press Tye, Michael. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. MIT Press, 2011, pp. 123–37. ISBN: 9780262516631.
13 Stalnaker, Robert C. Chapters 2–4 in Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University Press, 2008. ISBN: 9780199545995.
14 Student presentations. No new readings assigned.
15 Overview session. No new readings assigned.