

THE 1984 RIOTS:  
LAWRENCE, MASSACHUSETTS

by

Joseph D. Duran  
B.A., California State University, Northridge  
(1972)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE  
DEGREE OF  
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

June 1985

© Joseph D. Duran

The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.

Signature of Author Joseph D. Duran  
Department of Urban Studies and Planning  
June 12, 1985

Certified by Donald A. Schon  
Donald A. Schon  
Thesis Supervisor

Certified by \_\_\_\_\_  
Mark Schuster  
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by Phillip L. Clay  
Phillip L. Clay  
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE  
OF TECHNOLOGY

JUL 17 1985 Archives

LIBRARIES

THE 1984 RIOTS:

LAWRENCE, MASSACHUSETTS

by

Joseph D. Duran

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies & Planning  
on June 12, 1985 in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the Degree of Master in City Planning

ABSTRACT

A series of interviews were conducted with key informants at governmental and community levels regarding the civil disturbances which broke out in the city of Lawrence, Massachusetts on August 8, 1984. The interviews sought to collect informants' impressions regarding the causes of these disturbances. Based on these impressions, an assessment was made regarding the intergovernmental and community-level action-responses to the riots.

The 1984 riots in Lawrence, Massachusetts, are seen here as political expressions on the part of the Lawrence Hispanic community. The riots are regarded as an important dimension of the Hispanic community's struggle for political equality based on claims for social and economic equality and demands for increased access to, and responsiveness from, the Lawrence city government.

Four critical factors of political mobilization are examined with regard to the Lawrence Hispanic community. First, the group size of the Lawrence Hispanic community is identified as a critical resource for political incorporation into city government. Second, the limited political experience of Lawrence Hispanics in city affairs is seen as a pivotal basis for continued activism. Third, the nascent organizational development of collective efforts to address Hispanic issues is seen as an emerging critical resource for political mobilization. Fourth, the need for the development of broad-based electoral coalitions is identified as the most critical resource area in need of further development.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Donald A. Schon

Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Education

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE:.....	i
ABSTRACT:.....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS:.....	iii
CHAPTER ONE: "PROTEST, POLITICS AND PLURALISM".....	1
CHAPTER TWO: "THE STORIES BEHIND THE NUMBERS".....	15
CHAPTER THREE: "THE LAWRENCE ROOTS: MEANING AND ACTION".....	41
CHAPTER FOUR: "INTERPRETATIONS AND RESPONSES".....	57
CHAPTER FIVE: "PLANNING WITH THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY OF LAWRENCE"....	83
FOOTNOTES:.....	110
BIBLIOGRAPHY:.....	113

## CHAPTER ONE

### "PROTEST, POLITICS AND PLURALISM"

#### 1.0 Introduction to chapter:

In this chapter I will introduce some of the key themes to be used in later chapters as the bases for examining the stories collected for this report. The stories were collected to indicate a range of select critical perceptions regarding the riots of last summer in Lawrence, Massachusetts.

First among the themes, is the view that the riots are legitimately seen as political expressions; as part of the slow social process moving toward the incorporation of Lawrence Hispanics into the political arena. The riots are seen here as an important dimension of Hispanics' struggle for political equality in Lawrence.

A second theme refers to the conventional wisdom which claims that relative social inequality, between people of color and the white population, represents a significant precipitant to social protest movements; inequality is regarded a causal factor in explaining riots. On this point most observers agree.

Third, the brief review of the riot and social protest literature gleans several important issues: the dynamic interaction between governors and governed; how this interaction is seen as a bargaining process where resources are required to bargain; a process within which policies and practices evolve as social learning takes place; and how this learning may facilitate or inhibit the mobilization of challenging parties and coalitions.

Also in this chapter, we will examine how this interactive

relationship has been characterized by reciprocal conflict in other locales. In the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb study (1), the "Theory of Political Incorporation" is developed; a theory which identifies the necessary resources for successful minority mobilization which in turn leads to political incorporation into city government.

The mobilization of challenging parties, where protest activity --including riots -- is seen as part of that challenge, will be examined as it relates to the traditional view of pluralist democracy.

### 1.1 Struggles for Political Equality:

"The gradual development of the equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact," claims de Tocqueville (2) in his view of the "irresistible revolution," which he asserts as having advanced for centuries in spite of "such amazing obstacles." He describes progress toward equality as "universal... ..durable..it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress..."

There are several key propositions in de Tocqueville's view that are pertinent to the discussion at hand: that social movements toward equality ("revolution"), seen in their historical and "providential" dimension, exert a seemingly natural force, unmitigated by "human interference." Moreover, these social movements are aided in their progress by "all events" and "all men."

These propositions serve as good starting questions to begin an examination of the set of events leading to, and following, the riots which surfaced August 8th and 9th, 1984, in Lawrence, Massachusetts. These riots are seen here as political expressions by

the Hispanic community in Lawrence which shares much in common with the history of such struggles which have sought to expand claims for political equality to more broadly encompass demands for social and economic equality as well.

It is certainly well beyond the scope of this "short thesis" to recount the history of the struggles to remove the ascriptive barriers to political participation, such as birth, wealth, race, religion, and more recently, gender. These barriers have been removed in the face of defeats, setbacks, social control and repression; and other such "amazing obstacles" and "human interference;" they have shared the themes of access to governmental decision-making and responsiveness in governmental policies and practices.

The discussion in this report will center on the interaction between the Lawrence Hispanics, seen as individuals, families, and small groups --within the 'community' context,-- vis a vis official actors, seen here as institutional representatives, social planners and other actors -- within the 'intergovernmental' context. Both contexts are understood to function within a broader political economy; and as part of the larger social context, or body politic. The interaction between the intergovernmental actors and those representing the community level are influenced by this political economy as they also depend on the ultimate acceptance of the body politic. Thus, while this report will focus on the dynamic nature of this interaction between governors and governed, it will acknowledge the influence of politically-based economic forces and in particular, of white response, as these relate to the conditions bearing on the political existence of Hispanics in the city of Lawrence, Massachusetts.

## 1.2 Political Incorporation of Minorities and Pluralist Democracy.

### 1.2.0 Preface to discussion.

The Browning, Marshall, and Tabb study, discussed below, was chosen as a framework for discussion of the Lawrence riots because it is one of very few studies that specifically examines the role of Hispanic communities in social protest. Also, the among the cities examined were four which share much in common with Lawrence with regard to size of the city and the relative percentage of Hispanic residents. Further, the scope of the study, examining minority group mobilization over a twenty year period is seen as helpful in appreciating the gradual process of community development.

### 1.2.1 The Theory of Political Incorporation.

The Theory of Political Incorporation was developed by Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, and presented in their recent publication, Protest Is Not Enough, (1984).

Looking at ten northern California cities over a twenty-year period, the authors examined the impact of the national civil rights movement and federal social programs on local minority (Blacks and Hispanics) mobilization, the political incorporation of these minorities into city government, and the policy responsiveness to minorities on the part of city governments.

Based on this analysis they formulated a theory of "minority mobilization and white response in which electoral mobilization is a key to political incorporation, and incorporation in liberal dominant

coalitions is central to policy responsiveness. The stronger forms of incorporation -- including the replacement of conservative coalitions on city councils and minority participation in new, more liberal coalitions -- are necessary and sufficient for sustained policy responsiveness to the interests of minority groups" (p.240).

The theory asserts that "incorporation" depends on the determined and sustained mobilization of minority resources in the electoral arena. These resources are identified as (1) group size; (2) the amount of support for minority interests among the rest of the electorate; (3) organizational development; and (4) political experience.

They found that although "demand-protest" often contributes to electoral mobilization, demand-protest alone is not enough to produce strong incorporation of minority interests in city government. "And although demand-protest yields some measurable gain in responsiveness from city governments, the incorporation of the group yields more" (p.240).

The basic resources of group size and support, facilitated by organizational development and political experience, create strong incentives where they are present and strong constraints where they are not.

As also found by Clark and Ferguson (3), the evolution of group mobilization and the response of dominant coalitions is contingent on the traditional local ways of dealing with demands on city government. Conservative coalitions tend to resist minority mobilization demands and to oppose their efforts to gain access to city government; liberal coalitions tend to co-opt.

The theory gives special prominence to electoral effort and



the role of coalitions in electoral mobilization and in governmental decision making. In particular, it stresses the need to appreciate coalition-formation and development over time. Also key to the theory is the relevance of ideology. Browning et al found that "conservative and liberal coalitions (dominant in city government) responded very differently to minority mobilization and demands" (p.241).

### 1.2.2 The Pluralist View of Democracy.

The Browning et al study focused on two central questions: (1) how open were city government systems? and (2) how responsive were city government actions and policies to minority interests. These questions bear directly on two features of the pluralist view of democracy: the condition of open access to the political arena, and, the condition of balance of power (particularly as it refers to responsiveness of policy and practice).

Robert Dahl (4) suggests that the "fundamental axiom in the theory and practice of American pluralism is: Instead of a single center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of power, none of which can be wholly sovereign." This is important because the "existence of multiple centers of power...will help tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully."

Pluralism is seen from inside the political arena. This arena is seen more or less as an orderly contest, "carried out by the classic pluralist rules of bargaining, lobbying, logrolling, coalition formation, negotiation, and compromise."

#### 1.2.2.0 Political access.

Entry into the political arena is seen by

the pluralist view as an open access situation with "no barriers to a group getting a hearing" (p.24). As Dahl argues: "Because even minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions they strongly object to, the consent of all will be won in the long run." According to this pluralist view: "the institutions ....offer organized minorities innumerable sites in which to fight, perhaps to defeat, at any rate to damage an opposing coalition" (p.329).

#### 1.2.2.1 Balance of Power.

"Because one center of power is set against another," Dahl continues (p.24), "power itself will be tamed, civilized, controlled, and limited to decent human purposes, while coercion, the most evil form of power, will be reduced to a minimum."

When a political system meets these conditions, Dahl argues, neither rigidity nor tyranny will result. No one group will become dominant for several reasons: 1. self restraint -- the institutions will "generate politicians who learn how to deal gently with opponents, who struggle endlessly in building and holding coalitions together, who doubt the possibilities of great change, who seek compromises" (Dahl, p.329);

2. Long-run self interests encourage self restraint -- in a world of ever changing coalitions the "wise government" does not antagonize groups which may be tomorrow's allies on a set of other issues; 3.

Short-run self interests --

around concern for internal stability discourage the abuse of power because factionalism can occur within the ranks or could be stimulated by such abuse; and, 4. power -- which threatens to become abusive stimulates countervailing power coalitions.

According to pluralist thought, the existence of these conditions help to produce responsiveness. As William Gamson (5) observes: "The critical element in this argument is that in the normal operation of the political system, dissatisfied groups are encouraged to organize and translate their dissatisfaction into concrete political demands. Several elements in the political system lead to such encouragement" (p.8). These elements include: 1. competitive elections; 2. organization into alliances; 3. multiple points of access to political system; and 4. a normative commitment of competing parties to open access.

Gamson continues his observations on pluralist thought: "Thus, no group will long remain unrepresented, and it will find its entry into the political arena smoothed and facilitated by powerful allies who find it useful to do so for their own purposes. There will be no need for such groups to violate the existing rules of democratic politics to bring about the remedy of legitimate grievances."

The result is an image of the U.S. political system as a game involving bargaining and trading, where any number can play, with the rule of entry being that one agrees to behave oneself. As Gamson observes: "The rules prohibit the use of violence or any efforts aimed at permanently removing other contestants from the game. The essence of the competition is bargaining for relative advantage, with the attendant tactics of influence trading, coalition formation, logrolling and the like" (p.9).

### 1.3 The "Flaw in the Pluralist Heavens."

What Gamson observes, and Browning et al also found, is that

the pluralist explanation of democratic ideals-in-action, being an inside view, does not centrally address how challenging groups first get in from 'outside;' particularly when such groups are relatively less powerful and when they encounter barriers to political entry unaccounted for in the pluralist explanation. As Schattschneider (6) writes: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably 90 percent of the people cannot get into the pressure system."

The "heavenly chorus" seems a well established group. As Lowi (7) writes: "Groups provide a great deal of social efficiency...They are effective means of articulating and representing interests and providing low-level social controls that reduce the need for governmental coercion. But the very success of established groups is a mortgage against a future of new needs that are not yet organized or are not readily accomodated by established groups."

How then do challenging members become part of the establishment?

How do they secure the opportunity to join in the 'chorus,' and perhaps sing a different song? How do they take out a 'mortgage,' one perhaps that can accomodate the future of "new needs?"

For many challenging groups, the point(s) of entry have necessarily been approached through mobilizing resources, and directing the force of these resources at specific targets. By appealing to the targets' "reference publics," per Lipsky (8), challenging groups attempt to secure a favorable response from these reference publics who may ultimately help support entry into the political system. It is often a 'fight' for entry; not always the pleasant joining together for

the 'bargaining game.'

The magnitude of this fight "in the short run," according to Charles Tilly (9), "depends on an interaction of the tactics of contenders and the coercive practices of government." In the longer run "the magnitude of the conflict depends on the established means by which contenders can enter and leave the polity, and the frequency with which entries and exits actually occur" (p.4).

The pluralist image, therefore, seems only half-true. The appropriate image for challenging groups seeking entry into the political system is more like a fight with no holds barred, than it appears to be a well-behaved contest under well-defined rules. Lowi says it well again: "The history of the United States is not merely one of mutual accomodation among competing groups under the broad umbrella of consensus. The proper image of our society has never been a melting pot. In bad time, it is a boiling pot; in good times, it is a tossed salad. For those who are 'in,' this is all very well. But the price has always been paid by those who are 'out,' and when they do get in they do not always get in through a process of mutual accomodation under the broad umbrella of consensus" (p.53).

Do some challenging groups eventually get in the political arena? Browning et al found that some did. In their findings they concur with Gamson's assessment: "Some of these unruly and scrappy challengers do eventually become members. One might be tempted to conclude from this that the flaw in the pluralist heaven is, after all, rather exaggerated. Entry is not prohibited for those with the gumption, the persistence, and the skill to pursue it long enough. But this is, at best, cold comfort. Beyond the unsuccessful challengers....there may lie others unable to generate enough effort to

mount even a visible protest. If it costs so much to succeed, how can we be confident that there are not countless would-be challengers who are deterred by the mere prospect?" (p.143).

What Browning, Marshall, and Tabb found among their 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' challengers was that it takes more than "gumption, persistence, and skill." Their findings -- about the resources necessary for a successful challenge -- respond to the "problem of the powerless" as first articulated by one observer of black protest, James Q. Wilson (10). Wilson was among the first to suggest that protest activity be conceived as a problem of bargaining in which the basic problem is that (black) groups lack political resources to exchange.

#### 1.4 The Problem of Resources.

What Browning et al found was that challenging groups, in their case -- groups of color -- have been successful to the extent they have been able to mobilize the resources of group size and white support, which depended on coalition formation, organizational development, and political experience. Their standard for measuring success "is movement in the direction of increasing city government responsiveness to the interest of minority groups" (p.210). They concur with Lipsky's findings about protest being "one of the few ways in which relatively powerless groups can create bargaining resources." And they share with Lipsky's concern that the outcome of successful challenges -- responsiveness -- goes beyond "symbolic assurances." The Theory of Political Incorporation addresses the receipt and gain of more tangible rewards: political participation and power.

### 1.5 Implications for Lawrence.

The riots which broke out in the Lower Tower Hill neighborhood of Lawrence, Massachusetts, on August 8th, 1984, and continued intermittently for two days brought an extraordinary amount of attention on the problems of this city of approximately 65,000 residents, twenty-eight miles north of Boston.

The 'primary voice' of the riots was immediately identified by most observers -- the media, government officials, community residents, and members of the general public-at-large -- as that of the generally low-income Hispanic residents of Lawrence. Despite the fact the riots began as a fight between a Hispanic and a white person, and escalated to an altercation between a group of Hispanic versus a group of white persons, the public awareness of the long standing social problems of the predominately Hispanic Lower Tower Hill neighborhood has led most observers to regard the riots as most directly related to the civic status of Lawrence Hispanics in general.

In this sense, therefore, I will view the riots as "articulate protests against genuine grievances" in keeping with Fogelson's standards for an interpretation of protest activity (11). They are protests because they became an attempt, once escalated beyond the initial fight scenario, to call attention of larger society to the dissatisfactions of many low income Lawrence residents. The riots are articulate because they were restrained, selective, and directed at the immediate sources of social discontent -- first, taking the form of cross-racial tension, and then directed at legal authority, and ultimately, local government. Moreover, they are genuine because, by the standards of democratic equality, the conditions of Hispanics in

Lawrence, who are disproportionately represented among the poor, are deplorable.

As will be indicated by the stories which follow, the various responses to these riots take various forms. The legislative and executive responses are allocative in nature, with financial, material, and human resource allocations aimed 'at' primary measures of social control and adjustment, and secondary measures fostering socio-political development. The institutional responses, initiated by these legislative and executive actions, have been prescriptive in nature, with planning efforts targeted 'for' recipient populations in the form of 'treatment' programs and services.

The response of primary interest here is that emergent, 'derivative,' community-level response; the community folks 'with' whom community developers, social planners, and official governmental actors would be well-advised to negotiate a new social contract. A social contract based on the fundamental objectives of governmental access and responsiveness, initiated by dialogue; and acknowledging the interdependent relationships which exist between the city and its white and brown populations.

This social contract, of an irrepressible political nature, is a fundamental and necessary platform upon which any community development plans -- social, economic, physical -- must be established. Indeed, I firmly believe, if the plans generated by last summer's riots fail to earn the 'unofficial licensure' of the total community -- particularly, the Hispanic community -- the future of the City of Lawrence will continue to be characterized by the tenuous social conditions of mutual fear, distrust, and instability. These are the conditions, I believe, that attend any plans which do not sufficiently



account for the significant political participation of all citizens to whom such plans refer. It is only with such political power that the 'symbolic assurances' of a concerned government make any 'real sense.' It is only with the 'tangible rewards' of political incorporation that such extreme and disruptive events as riots become politically unnecessary.

## CHAPTER TWO

### "THE STORIES BEHIND THE NUMBERS"

#### 2.0 Introduction to chapter:

In this chapter, the discussion begins with the relevance of acknowledging the presence and relative inequality of the Hispanic population from national, regional, and local perspectives. The data which follow are presented as indicators of this inequality. The stories which accompany the data introduce into the discussion some of the multiple dimensions within which this information can be related to issues bearing directly on the political, social, and economic conditions faced by Lawrence and its Hispanic community.

Except as otherwise noted, comments included here are taken from personal interviews with the author; which were conducted with assurances of anonymity. In some cases, names of speakers appear when permission was granted by the speaker or when comments were spoken in a public forum.

#### 2.1 Toward a visible community.

Interestingly, many commentators from de Tocqueville to Myrdal have seen inequality, as a precipitant to social protest, in literally "black and white" terms; as indicated by de Tocqueville's words: "If there ever are great revolutions there, they will be caused by the presence of blacks upon American soil. That is to say, it will not be the equality of social conditions but rather their inequality which may give rise thereto" (1).

Theorists and other experts involved in the report of the U.S.

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (2) pointed to the danger of a divided society in 1968, saying: "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white -- separate and unequal."

Within twenty years after the Second World War, the civil rights movement was seen by Myrdal in terms of the "American dilemma" of "an ever-raging conflict" between egalitarian beliefs and the unequal treatment and position of blacks.

The United States is not simply a two-color nation, black and white. The U.S. Hispanic population, according to the 1980 U.S. Census (3), represented 6.4% of the total U.S. population of 226 million, or 14.6 million in absolute terms. The black population was enumerated at 25.5 million in the 1980 Census, or approximately 11.3% of the total population.

Although the enumeration of Hispanics was substantially improved in the 1980 Census as compared to the 1970 Census (see footnote), many experts agree that the 1980 Census continued to undercount Hispanics and other minorities. Estimates have placed the population size in 1980 to be closer to 20 million Hispanics, or 8.9% of total population, accounting for estimates of the number of undocumented residents as well as Census undercount of U.S. Hispanic citizens. Both figures exclude the 3.1 million Puerto Ricans living in the Puerto Rico.

Some have suggested that due to the undercount, coupled with high fertility and immigration rates, the nation's Hispanic population may surpass blacks, or at least equal their size, in the coming decade.

The relevance of acknowledging the presence and size of the population, with particular regard to potential social protest, is underscored by the relative inequality Hispanics experience compared to

the white majority.

## 2.2 Hispanics and inequality: the national perspective.

Given that inequality between blacks and whites dominates the literature related to social protest movements, particularly as these movements include riots, it is important to stress that Hispanics also form a seriously disadvantaged population on a national scale. A few examples are indicative: In 1981 median family income for Hispanics was \$16,401, lower than the \$23,517 of white families but higher than black family income of \$13,266. In 1982, nearly 30 percent of Hispanic families lived in poverty, two-and-a-half times the rate for whites. The average unemployment rate for Hispanics in 1983 was 13.8 percent, compared to 8.4 percent for whites and 19.5 percent for blacks. (For census purposes, "persons of Spanish origin," as a multiracial population, are also included in the black and white population groups). Low educational attainment figures are also a cause for concern. Though Hispanics' educational attainment has generally increased over the past decade, dropout rates remain high. One recent census estimate put the percentage of Hispanics eighteen and nineteen years old who were neither high school enrollees nor graduates at 37 percent, compared to 16 percent for white and 19 percent for blacks (4).

If experts are correct in their assumption that inequality is a significant precipitant to social unrest, and that it can be seen as a causal factor in explaining riots, the 'American dilemma' must therefore be seen with a specific view to the Hispanic presence in the United States.

Certainly, the case of the Lawrence riots shares a history of

social unrest among Hispanic communities in this country. Hispanics participated in the civil rights movements, albeit to a lesser degree than blacks, in most cities, as documented in the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb study. Thus, we are well-advised to take a closer look at historical trends of inequality vis a vis Hispanics, as well as population growth trends.

By appreciating Hispanics as a visible community we can begin to understand their claims for access to, and responsiveness from government. We can further appreciate the common ground Hispanics share with other racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities, who likewise face the problems of inequality. Moreover, we can appreciate the potential power of these groups joining together in a 'rainbow coalition' demanding political, social and economic equality.

## 2.3 Lawrence Hispanics and inequality.

### 2.3.0 The State of the City.

The Kerner 1967-1968 National Advisory Commission's widely accepted basic finding that one major cause of the ghetto disorders of the 1960's was the shameful conditions of life in the cities," was reiterated by the Commission on the Cities in the 1970's, in their report -- The State of the Cities (5). This commission found that "since 1968 most of the changes in those conditions have been for the worse. Housing is still the national scandal it was then. Schools are more tedious and turbulent. The rates of crime and unemployment and disease and heroin addiction are higher. Welfare rolls are larger. And, with few exceptions, the relations between minority communities and the police are just as hostile."

In the following sections, we will examine just a few of the

significant indicators of social inequality, as well as some interview stories which relate these data to general issues facing Lawrence. These stories acknowledge some of the conditions under which Lawrence Hispanics live. The stories of some informants are seen as part of the gradual rise of the informants' political consciousness and as indicators of their capacity for action.

### 2.3.1 Education.

The Hispanic population in Lawrence is poorly educated as indicated by the census data. In the adult population (25 years or older), the median level of education is 8.9 years, or just beyond junior high school. Just over a quarter of this group (26%) has a high school diploma. In the total Lawrence population median years of schooling for adults is 12.1, and nearly half (48.2%) have high school diplomas; equivalent for men and women. Hispanic adults are consequently at a clear disadvantage competing for all but unskilled jobs.

26.6% of the young adult population (18-24) have less than 8 years of schooling, and 38.3% have high school diplomas. Relatively, the young adult population indicates an improvement in school attainment as compared the adult population; still the number who have left school without diplomas is alarming.

In one interview, I was informed that at Lawrence High School alone, with a total student body population of 1600 students, the dropout rate of Hispanics from year to year is "at least 50%." This is a remarkable attrition rate considering that Hispanics represent 40% of the total student body. The national dropout rate for Hispanic children is 36% and in Boston estimates are as high as 69%.

One school administrator claimed that Hispanics in Lawrence schools "on the average face almost insurmountable odds against their success. The schools are not equipped to deal with problems of a culturally mixed population. The language difficulties, cultural insensitivity on the part of staff, racism among the children and staff, and negative teacher attitudes toward Hispanics are among some of our greatest challenges. Lawrence is not a good place if you are a Hispanic youth in school here. As a matter of fact, Lawrence schools are not a good place for any kid...the school system here is in shambles....if the schools are bad for kids in general you know they are worse for minorities."

"The situation of Hispanics in Lawrence schools must be seen in the context of the city budget." states a school administrator. "For the last five months the school budget has been the subject of some of the most acrimonious debate I have ever heard between a school department and a city government. It has particular implications for Hispanics. Consider the Mayor's comments at a city council meeting that bilingual programs should not be funded since "minorities can't even speak their own language."

The Lawrence City Council recently approved a 19.2 million dollar budget for fiscal year 1985-86; an increase of one million over the previous year but less than the 24 million dollar requested by the School Superintendent, Eugene Thayer. Noteworthy is the fact that before the passage of Proposition 2 1/2 the school budget was \$18 million for 7,800 students. This year the enrollment is up to 8,700, half of whom are Hispanic students; representing a 55 percent increase in Hispanic students since 1980.

Despite Thayer's numerous attempts to appeal to the city

council and the mayor (who is the chairperson of the School Committee as well), he recently announced a layoff of thirty-five teachers positions. According to Thayer: "I think we've reached the point of devastation in this school system. It's absolutely disgusting."

According to the Teacher's Union President: "Once again the teachers are taking it on the chin. I think this is bad for the kids. We already have classes with 35 kids or more." The crowded size of classrooms became the focus of a school committee demonstration outside of city hall. One of the demonstrators informed me: "This demonstration does not even begin to address the special problems faced by Hispanic kids in our school system. The entire school system is in a state of crisis so you've got to figure this makes it worse for Hispanics. With the over-crowding in classrooms I have talked to many teachers who claim they are no longer concerned about the high drop out rates, truancies, and high absenteeism among Hispanic kids.....they almost seem to welcome it."

For 1983-84 Lawrence had a per pupil cost of \$1,915 for about 8,800 pupils. The state average is \$2,866. About 96 percent of the cities and towns in Massachusetts spend more per pupil than Lawrence (6). According to the school superintendent, because of this low per-pupil expenditure, "Lawrence schools do not provide a guidance program with psychological and sociological counseling. The schools ought to have 12 to 14 counselors and more school adjustment counselors. There is no drop-in center to handle youngsters with drug, alcohol, suicide and pregnancy problems. There is no foreign language instruction in elementary and junior high schools. There is no summer or evening programs which means if a kid flunks a course there is no way to make it up. There are no enrichment programs in writing,



science or math."

According to a group of Hispanic parents with whom I met, the "typical response we have received when we have voiced our concerns to the school principals and teachers is that we need to understand the schools are bad for every one and we should not be so upset because they are not discriminating. They seem to think just because we are Hispanics that the only concern we have is discrimination. They do not take into account that we are no different than other parents when it comes to a quality education for our kids. Without the special programs, for slow learners and bright kids, none of our kids have a prayer of a chance to survive or excel. For the slow learners it means they will probably drop out. For the bright kids it means they will not be able to compete for the better colleges."

In 1984-85 fiscal year, the school system received an emergency \$1.2 million allotment from the governor based on a \$4 per pupil to be spent for school supplies and field trips. The schools will receive over \$40,000 for the year because of the percentage of immigrant children, an allotment from the federal Emergency Immigrant Education Assistance Program. According to one school principal, "these allotments are urgently needed but they also help the mayor avoid centrally addressing the school budget as a priority in the city budget. Without some of the special money for bilingual programs and immigrant children, I am convinced this mayor and this city council would not support any special assistance to racial or linguistic minorities....the city schools are dependent on state and federal aid.."

The total city budget for the upcoming year is \$67 million. According to the mayor "there is no room in the city budget for an

increase beyond the 19.2 million for the school system." He claims the rest must come from the state and he expects the educational reform bill "now working its way through the state legislature will provide the additional two million dollars Thayer claims he needs to keep the school system at current staffing."

According to the Lawrence Mayor: "Massachusetts has one of the worst records in the nation in financing education and they should should pay more than it does...."

According to state estimates (7), Lawrence received \$31.4 million in aid from the state for the 1984-85 fiscal year, an increase of over \$7 million from the year before. Projected state aid for the 1986 fiscal year is \$34.9 million. The state is also giving Lawrence an additional \$4 million in aid for construction of two new schools. When asked about the seeming discrepancy between the mayor's comments about state educational aid to Lawrence, one city councillor claimed: "He's (the mayor) is playing political games with the school children of this city..." referring to the Mayor's recent announcement to run for a 12th term based on a \$700,000 surplus in the city budget. "The Mayor has no commitment to quality education, I think because of the large percentage of Hispanic student population. He treats the schools like he does the housing projects....he does not want to make either too attractive to increased inflow of Hispanics..."

One Hispanic parent summed it up in this way: "When you look at the mess the school is in... just as a starting point... you begin to see why there were riots in Lawrence. From the school situation, you see teenage dropouts and unemployment. If the city does not provide good schools you certainly don't think they provide jobs or recreation for kids, do you? And then you take a look at the housing

situation, then unemployment for adults, and then city services, the entire city is in bad shape. I don't condone violence, but I think those who rioted did the city a civic service....by bringing attention to the many problems for which the city is to blame....if there are riots in the future, I wouldn't be surprised if parents, teachers, and students participated in them...that's just how mad some people are.....things have gotten worse since the riots not better."

### 2.3.2 Housing.

Hispanics are concentrated in four Lawrence neighborhoods: Arlington, Arlington Extension, Lower Tower Hill (the site of the riots), and Newbury Street. Each of these neighborhoods is at least one-third Hispanic.

In accordance with public testimony obtained at the public hearings conducted by the Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs, in September of 1984, housing is seen by the community as a critical area of need. During the past ten years the city has lost over 1,000 housing units. In 1980 Hispanics paid the same rent as whites despite the fact that they live in more crowded housing(50-100% greater household density than whites), of poorer quality as evidenced by housing valued at half that of whites' housing. The problems of housing must be further understood in the context of a 96% renter population among Hispanics.

1,070 families live in the city's four housing projects. Of these, 90% are Hispanic in the Merrimck Courts; 83% are Hispanic in the Beacon Courts; 87% of the Hancock Courts are Hispanic; and in the Stadium Courts 27% are Hispanic.

According to Millie Bass, who lives in the Beacon Court

housing project: "The Lawrence Housing Authority is becoming a city within a city. Between rubbish removal, providing our own security, our own social services, we are being cut off from the city."

Residents with whom I spoke complained that the lack of security and poor response from calls to police are responsible for the recent rash of "gangs terrorizing project residents." "Since last month (April, 1985) we have had a taxi driver murdered, a construction worker was stoned and a resident stabbed," reports one project resident. Another housing development resident states: "The city blames the projects for the riots....even though they have promised to improve the projects since the riots...there is still an attitude at city hall that if they had their way they would kick all of us out of the city...I know I complained to city hall because of the cockroaches, bad plumbing, and the fact that the police did not answer my calls when I being harassed by the gang of kids that run wild here...and the dope dealing...all I got.. was ignored."

According to Roland Hatch, the city's Housing Director, there have been over 13 burglaries in the last month alone, which prompts him to want to use a \$220,000 state grant prompted by last summer's riots to study the "possibility of setting up a separate bilingual police unit specifically trained to work in housing projects." Over 18 million dollars has been allocated this year (one million of which was part of the "riot aid legislation" approved in September, 1984) for improvements to the housing developments. While Hatch sees this inflow of funds as necessary, many long term city programs and services require assurance of longer term funding; "assurances this city council seems to me unwilling to make."

"Unfortunately, the introduction many Hispanics get to

Lawrence is through the housing projects," laments one informant. "The projects are well known centers of drug traffic, the burglaries and terrorizing are frequent occurrences, police are afraid to go near them much less walk inside, and the litter and filth is disgusting. When I hear the mayor complain that twenty-five years ago there were flower boxes in the project windows and the projects were something to be proud of, I wonder if he realizes that he has been the one person most responsible for the decline in the quality of the projects. It is no wonder people who live there are unmotivated and feel hopeless. The city has done nothing to respect them or to provide the necessary improvements....at least not until the riots hit."

"Why should we plant flowers when cockroaches crawl through our food, when the plumbing does not work, and heating does not work?" adds another informant. "That's why you saw the signs during the riots (the curfew that prohibited people from leaving the projects)....the signs said: "Don't lock us in our cages - We are not animals"....but if you lived here you would see that they are cages.....and the riots rattled the cages....and you know what happens then.....people react as if they were being treated like animals.... believe the city would be spending a dime to fix them up?"

To date there is no housing court in the Lawrence area. In January, 1985, a coalition of groups organized to pressure the state to pass legislation for a housing court; legislation which was introduced in last year's session but failed to pass because of a logjam of bills during the final weeks of the session. This year, Sen. Patricia McGovern of Lawrence is the sponsor of one of three bills calling for the creation of a housing court. According to one Hispanic resident: "This is a great idea but unless they provide for bilingual services,

unlike the other courts, many of us will not be able to bring our grievances against the slumlords into court....and when I talk about the slumlords I mean the Housing Authority too..." (Translated from Spanish). According the bill's sponsors there is no current specific provision for bilingual services.

### 2.3.3 Unemployment and Labor Force Participation.

Unemployment statistics, reflecting the percentage of those in the labor force who are not working, tell us only about all people 16 and over who are not disabled and who have worked and/or looked for work in the past month. Nearly 60% of the Hispanic and white population is participating in the labor force; the remaining 40% has not looked for work recently for reasons unknown here. The rate of unemployment for Hispanics is 11.5% as compared to the white population rate of 6.3%. Unemployment in the Lawrence-Haverhill SMSA is the fourth highest rate in the state.

When one looks at the 16-19 age group the differences are even more striking with 35% of the Hispanics youth unemployed as compared to 11.4% white unemployed within this age cohort. The implications are many when one considers this data in combination with educational attainment data --- an alarming percentage of the Hispanic young are neither at work or at school.

"The riots were about jobs...pure and simple." claims one Lawrence resident. "Without decent employment the residents of this city have no investment here....why not riot?"

"You try to find a job in this city and what happens?" asks a Hispanic male who claims to have applied for over thirty positions this year alone. "I am told to get job training. I apply to job training

and they tell me I have to go to school and learn English. I apply for an English program and they tell me I have to wait for six months for an opening. I wait six months and they tell me I have to wait until they can find a bilingual teacher. I do not speak or understand English too well so none of this makes sense to me.....the program that is supposed to teach me English does not have anyone there who speaks Spanish?.... In Puerto Rico I was trained as a machinist and a supervisor. Here all I am offered is custodial work which pays me less than I get on welfare (He is the sole parent of two young children)....I hate being on welfare but what can I do?" (translated from Spanish).

At a group meeting of 13 unemployed Hispanics, hosted by a resident of the Merrimack housing project, I had an opportunity to discuss with them their thoughts and feelings regarding their unemployed status. One participant captured the group's sentiments: "The beginning of this year, I lost my job at the shoe factory. Since then I have tried to find a job but since I do not speak English well, I am told so many things I do not understand that I am left to believe that they just don't want to hire me because I'm Latino...I do not like to think it is discrimination but since the riots people seem afraid to hire us....or they tell us to go and see about this new training program starting up. I want a job..the training programs do not pay...they do not ensure a job...and they teach you English that helps you order food in a restaurant but not what you need to know to speak up on the job... Others (employers) have told me plain to my face that I should go back where I came from. I need a job but I need my dignity too. Now I hear there are more jobs coming into the area. Suddenly, my friends who are also unemployed become very secretive.

They do not want me to find out about the jobs...and I do not tell them what I have heard either...it is the competition....first I get a job and then I will tell you about the opportunity....this goes against my concern for my people...but in America we must all compete.."  
(translated from Spanish).

#### 2.3.4 Type and Location of Employment.

76% of employed Hispanic population work in the manufacturing industry as compared to 46.5% of whites who work in manufacturing firms. 10% of Hispanics and 22% of whites work in the service sector. 70% of those Hispanics in the manufacturing sector list the nature of their employment as "machine operator." This information, combined with income data, suggest that most Hispanics are heavily concentrated in low-wage assembly line manufacturing, probably non-union, with little advancement potential, poor job security vulnerable to economic downturns.

Recent estimates claim that as many as 1,000 new jobs will be created in the Lawrence area in the next two years, with the extension of the 'high tech corridor' moving up from Boston through the Merrimack Valley. It is thought by some labor organizers that without adequate provision of job readiness programs, particularly English-as-Second Language, or agreements to provide Spanish-speaking unit supervisors for job positions not specifically requiring English (as a transitional on-the-job language training process), many Lawrence Hispanics may be unable to take advantage of the anticipated boom. Local labor organizers have shifted to a community-organizing focus, with particular concerns for targetting the Hispanic community, in an effort to use the city-state-federally financed Industrial Revenue Bonds as an



organizing platform to secure employer commitments in four basic areas: 1. prevailing wages; 2. jobs for community residents first; 3. health and welfare provisions; and 4. job security. According to Rand Wilson, of the Communications Workers of America, and Enid Eckstein, of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, the organization of the Hispanic community around worker issues could represent a significant rallying point of a broader community coalition. "We are trying very hard to raise the level of consciousness among the Hispanic community around their potential power as an organized community bloc around worker's rights." A written communique of their local effort -- the Lawrence Area Strategy for Employment Rights (LASER) -- specifically addresses the issues of the "history of run away industry" and "industrial desertion" which have seriously affected the Lawrence Hispanic community in recent years, namely with the closing of a textile plant and three shoe factories at the beginning of this year; employers of an estimated 600 Hispanic work force.

To date, many Hispanics I spoke to remain unaware, and some distrustful, of the community-level workers' rights organizing efforts. As one informant told me after an open community meeting sponsored by LASER: "It is hard enough for a Hispanic to find a job here....if employers find out you are part of a union effort before you even apply...forget it...the only way it will work here is if the majority of us gets together...those employed and those unemployed ...and demand these things.....I think Hispanics here are a long way away from that kind of 'movida' (movement) even though it could be very helpful...part of the problem I see is that there are no Latino organizers whom we could trust are telling us the truth...in terms we can understand....I don't understand all this stuff about the (Industrial Revenue)

bonds..."

### 2.3.5 Income and Poverty Rates.

The median Hispanic income of \$8614 is less than half of the median white income of \$17,047. Female-headed households among Hispanics (38% of all families) have a median income of \$4,326.. 45.1% of Hispanic families are below the federal poverty level. 17% of all Lawrence families, and 11.4 percent of all white families are below the poverty level. One-third of Hispanic families receive public assistance; twice the rate of total Lawrence families.

Since these figures are from the 1980 census, we can assume that cuts in federal spending on domestic programs have forced more people below the poverty level. Nationally, there were 600,000 more Hispanic children living in poverty in 1983 than there had been in 1980, bringing the percentage of Hispanic children living in poverty up to 41.8% (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1984). Overall, 22% more Hispanics lived in poverty in 1983 than in 1980, so that one out of every four Hispanics were at or below poverty level.

At a group meeting of newly arrived Hispanics (recently settled within the last two years), I had the opportunity to hear their expressions of discontent and disappointed expectations about life in the United States. A telling comment follows: "Although conditions in Lawrence provide many favorable things...a small town life similar to our native towns...a Spanish-Speaking community ...churches, sports leagues, clubs, restaurants, and meeting centers...we are disappointed that the opportunities that brought us here are affected by the attitudes of the townspeople....many of whom have told us to go back where we came from...just like what they yelled during the

riots...actually, that's what I think started the riots...they assume we are all illegal aliens...many of us are citizens...as Puerto Ricans we have no choice about U.S. citizenship...but it seems the Americans have a choice about whether they will recognize us as citizens...We want to be part of the total community...to contribute our culture....to raise our families....but none of this is possible if we are kept in a position of earning such low wages...if we are kept at the bottom of the pile....if we are kept poor....People tell us that to make it in America we have to work and study hard...we would love to have a full chance to do those things.....a good and decent job and opportunities for a good education..but I do not see those opportunities here for everybody.....What it make come to is that we will have to fight for these things....and believe me, if it comes to that, we will fight...." (translated from Spanish).

#### 2.4 Group Size: Lawrence Hispanic Population Trends.

##### 2.4.0 Relevance to Browning, Marshall, Tabb Study.

In the Browning et al study, the group size of a challenging population is seen as a critical resource in political mobilization. In the following section, I will briefly profile some of the dimensions related to group size.

In following chapters the relevance of these data to electoral mobilization will be discussed further.

##### 2.4.1 Population Growth: The National Perspective.

The rapid growth of the Hispanic population in Lawrence reflects a national trend. Nationally, Hispanics became the fastest growing minority group in the U.S. during the 1970's;

attributable to high birth rates and immigration. In 1970, there were just over nine million Hispanics living in this country. By 1980, there were 60% more, approximately 14.6 million. The Hispanic population grew annually at the rate of 6.1% as compared to the 1.1% per year for the whole population, in contrast to the 1.8% increase of the Black population. With the illegal status of many Hispanics living in this country, it is quite likely that the Hispanic population is even larger than the above numbers suggest.

U.S. fertility rates have been falling from the "baby boom" of 3.8 children per woman in the 1950's to 1.8 children per woman in 1976. Hispanic birth rates, by contrast, show a very different trend. With an average of 3.5 children per woman, the Hispanic population appears to be entering its own "baby boom." According to national statistics for 1980, 62.4 babies were born for every 1,000 white women aged 15-44, as compared to 95.4 babies born for every 1,000 Hispanic women in that age group. On average, the Hispanic population is far younger, the largest cohorts being those 15-24, who are just entering peak child-bearing years. The median age for white women is 31 years; for Hispanic women it is 22 years.

The numerous factors related to immigration -- jobs during economic expansion; dependent economies of Latin American countries; employers' willingness to hire at substandard pay; political upheavals in Latin countries; and family unification immigration policies -- suggest that the current immigration flows to the U.S. from Latin American countries will continue.

According to a Ford Foundation report: "There is little doubt that the Hispanic population will continue to grow rapidly as a result of high fertility and high rates of immigration and slowly approach the

black population in size in the next fifteen years" (8).

#### 2.4.2 Population Growth: The Regional Perspective.

Massachusetts has the 12th largest Hispanic population (141,043) with the eighth highest growth rate. At over 11% per year, the Massachusetts' growth rate is nearly twice the national rate for Hispanics. This is in part due to the fact that the state has become an increasingly significant destination point of migration; with individual adults coming first and family migration following.

Within the state, Boston contains the largest Hispanic community, followed by Springfield, Lawrence and Worcester. But the highest concentration is found in Lawrence, where Hispanics represent at least 16.1% of the population. Estimates for the Lawrence Hispanic population for the year 1990 range from 34.3% to 52% of the total Lawrence population. These estimates assume the 1970-80 trends for all races for the former percentage estimate, and a constant white population with a 50% 1970-80 growth rate for Hispanics in the latter estimate.

It is interesting to note that cities in Massachusetts with rapidly growing Hispanic populations are those experiencing slight declines in total population, notably whites. Without the Hispanic growth, for example, cities such as Lawrence and Lowell would be experiencing dramatic population losses; of disastrous implications to local economies. In Lawrence it is estimated that Hispanics comprise 20% of the Lawrence consumer market, representing in 1980 an expenditure of \$29.3 million spent in the city mainly on white-owned businesses. Following population trends estimates, this figure of Hispanic consumer participation is projected between \$41-60 million in

1985, and \$60 to 100 million in 1990.

### 2.4.3 Age and Sex.

The Lawrence Hispanic population is notable for its youth. The median age for Hispanics (20.1 years) is much younger than that of the total population (29.7 years). There are virtually no Hispanic senior citizens in Lawrence and very few between the ages of 50 and 65. The number of women between 20 and 35, peak child bearing years, is striking and suggests a high birth rate in the coming years. The ratio of women to men in the Hispanic and total population is roughly 50-50.

The relative youthfulness of the Lawrence Hispanic community is further documented in the following statistics. 80% of all Hispanic families (as compared with 50% of all Lawrence families) include children under 18. Perhaps more important, 53% of Hispanic families (compared to 25% of all families) include children under 6.

Hispanic families with children under 18 and children under 6 are roughly similar in composition, almost evenly divided between two-parent and female-headed households. In Lawrence as a whole, there are far more two-parent households, and only 31% of families with children under 18 are headed by single women. Among Hispanics, 51.7% of all children under 18 live with one parent, and 43.6% live with two parents.

## 2.5 An Immigrant City.

### 2.5.0 The question of ethnic succession.

Lawrence has a long history of immigrant populations, dating to the early years of this century when European

immigrants were attracted to jobs available in a growing industrial economy. While it is well beyond the scope of this report to examine the conditions common and dissimilar to earlier immigrant populations and those under which Hispanics live today; suffice it to say that the question of "ethnic succession" remains an open one. By ethnic succession I mean that Hispanics today are becoming the successors to the earlier claimants for political position and governmental benefits. Indeed, earlier European populations used local governments to gain a political foothold and access to government jobs and services. While the term of ethnic succession implies an historically-based inevitability, it seems more realistic to regard the matter as more of a social and political choice than a destined historical process.

Two of my Lawrence informants have observed this process for years in their work as social service providers to, and community organizers of, immigrant populations in Lawrence. One states: "Those in power in Lawrence today have a short historical memory. Their basic assertion, in opposition to Hispanics here, is that they made it in this society without welfare, bilingual education, job programs, and the range of governmental benefits that we seek for immigrants today. They forget that it was the absence of many of those very programs that prevented many of their own from making it....and it was only through their incorporation into the political system that certain opportunities were opened up for them."

Her colleague interjects: "Maybe it is precisely because they remember this fact that prompts them to want to deny the help to Hispanics....to prevent them from making it.."

"Good point," continues the former informant, "But, they forget, too, the riots, protest, strikes, demonstrations, that make up

a part of their history....their history is one of a struggle for food, housing, education, jobs, decent treatment.....the very things they actively seek to deny Hispanics today.....it is a classic situation of the formerly oppressed becoming the oppressor.....I am not sure what you mean by ethnic succession...but I can tell you from my community organizing days in New York that any group who forgets how they struggled cannot rest comfortably while others struggle in their midst.....the politics of immigration are clear...if you help, because you once needed help, you will survive...if you deny the help to others you once needed, your political days are numbered...you will be replaced by those who protest against you.... or your own constituency will replace you because you have not been able to contain the protests.....if that is what you mean by ethnic succession....then, yes, the Irish and Italians who have risen to power in Lawrence are at a crossroads whether they realize it or not....those who will survive politically will understand how similar is their history to the current conditions at hand for Hispanics today...it is both a matter of racism and political ignorance....no government can progress smoothly with either ...whether they are incorporated in your personal attitudes or in your institutionalized way of doing things....."

#### 2.5.1 Country of Origin.

Lawrence Hispanics come from a number of different countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Since the U.S. Census enumerates only Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Mexicans separately; all other Hispanics fall into the "other category." Beyond the census limitations, observers in Lawrence believe the majority of these listed as "other" come from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,



and Guatemala.

Puerto Ricans, who began migrating to the Lawrence area in the 1950's, represent the oldest and largest segment of the Hispanic population. While many of them were originally recruited to work as seasonal farm workers, the availability of work in the manufacturing sector led to a permanent settlement in Lawrence, as in other urban centers. As of 1980, Puerto Ricans accounted for 59% of this population.

There are no reliable statistics that account for the Dominican migration which began in the mid-1960's when political unrest in the Dominican Republic and an expanding U.S. job market in the secondary job sector of unskilled, low-wage work sought immigrant labor.

#### 2.5.2 Language Barriers and Citizenship.

3.2% of Hispanics in Lawrence speak only English. This points to the fact that Lawrence Hispanics are primarily first and second generation immigrants. 64% are bilingual, 33% speak English poorly or not at all. Clearly, the language barriers inhibit communications among the general community and stand in the way of competition in the job market and the political arena. Among young people of 14 to 24 years, a slightly lower (22.9%) percentage speak little or no English. This suggests both older and younger populations are handicapped by language barriers. The implications of this language barrier extend to the education of children; assuming that many school-aged children come from households where English is not spoken and may therefore require special educational assistance in the public schools.

That a full 75% of Lawrence Hispanics are U.S. citizens points to the high percentage of Puerto Ricans in the population. Assuming the 6,065 Puerto Ricans in the Census are citizens, this leaves 1,681, or 40% of the non-Puerto Ricans who are U.S. citizens. Given the likelihood of a census undercount of Hispanics residing in Lawrence, it is again quite likely that the number of Hispanic citizens and non-citizens residing in Lawrence may be much higher than is known.

### 3.5.3 Residential stability.

Despite the recent wave of immigration, the Lawrence Hispanic community is remarkably stable with regard to place of residence. 31% of Hispanics had not moved between 1975 and 1980, lower than the 57% of the general population who had the same address over those five years. However, an additional 35% of Hispanics had been residing in the same county; this means that 66% of Hispanics had been living in the Lawrence area in 1975. That more than half of them had moved within the area at some point is probably attributable to the high percentage (96%) of renters, whom we can assume move frequently to improve their living situation; their low incomes probably forcing them to accept substandard and thus unstable housing.

Few Hispanics (5%) had moved to Lawrence from elsewhere in Massachusetts; over twice that number (11.5%) had relocated from another state, primarily in the Northeast. Many of the Hispanics I interviewed reported that quite a few of Lawrence Hispanics had come from New York, a common point of entry for immigrants into this country. The largest group of in-movers (17.3%) came from outside the continental U.S. (including Puerto Rico) so it does seem that Lawrence is also a first stop for some immigrants. It is hard to generalize

about the Lawrence Hispanics based on this evidence except to say that although a majority of them have lived in Lawrence for at least five years, there is still a sizeable group of newcomers who are settling into Lawrence for whom resettlement can be an anxiety-ridden experience.

These statistics, seen from the perspective of stability or instability, have important implications for mobilization of Lawrence Hispanics. From the perspective of residential stability, many Lawrence Hispanics have developed the neighborhood networks of communication, resource exchange, and support that facilitate civic involvement. For example, two crime watch groups have been started in predominately Hispanic neighborhoods and one in the Merrimack Courts which are within blocks of the riot scene.

From the perspective of instability, many Lawrence Hispanics will continue to encounter difficulties in finding decent and affordable housing as well as facing the racism, xenophobia, and fear that has characterized white response to immigrant populations in Lawrence, as across the country.

### 3.6 Chapter Summary.

In this chapter, I have attempted to present a demographic profile of the Hispanic community within the context of relative inequality. The implications of this data and information for understanding the riots of 1984, and as issues for political mobilization, will be discussed in the following three chapters.