

Veritas



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Background

- Prior to the merger:
 - ▶ Veritas was growing at approximately 60 - 70 percent per year and making 25% operating margins
 - ▶ Seagate was growing less than 30 percent per year and making 16% operating margins. In addition, during the 12 months prior to the merger, Seagate had lost market share to Computer Associates.
 - ▶ At the announcement Veritas stock plummeted by 42%.

Sales Execution

- Execute without missing numbers – from \$400 M to +billions in 5 years
- Stop the market share loss at Seagate
- Maintain Seagate operational efficiency
- Completely reorganize WW field ops – reduce field management by 40%

Veritas Sales Force

- Composition
 - ▶ 125 sales execs direct
 - ▶ 12 channel sales reps
- Market – have to earn it all over every year
 - ▶ Highly technical, competitive sale
- Compensation
 - ▶ 85K Base
 - ▶ 95 → 125K commission to OTE (on target earnings) = 180 → 220K
 - ▶ Base = 39 → 48% of total comp.
- Culture
 - ▶ Independent go-getters
 - ▶ “thoroughbreds”
 - ▶ Meat-eaters
 - ▶ “spend big to win big”
 - ▶ Veritas does not respect Seagate sales force

Seagate Sales Force

- Composition
 - ▶ 25 disti reps (15 distributors -- more than one rep per disti?)
 - ▶ 55 reseller reps (21,000 resellers)
 - ▶ 40 direct end user reps
- Market – 70% repeat sales, 30% new business
 - ▶ Low-end sale, very operational (accept orders, don't make mistakes, deliver on time)
- Compensation
 - ▶ 65K base
 - ▶ 85 → 95K commission; OTE = 150 → 160K
 - ▶ But 70% of business was “gimme”, so real numbers are
 - 125 to 132K base plus 20 to 30K commission
- Culture
 - ▶ Team oriented (no individual accountability)
 - ▶ 70% “gimmee”
 - ▶ Thinks of Veritas sales force as wild and out of control, but anxious about Sallaberry as new leader

Integration choices

1. Keep separate sales forces indefinitely

▶ Opportunity

- Allows separate comp plans, policies, etc.
- Keeps engines running smoothly
- Keeps Distri / reseller channel happy (no direct)

▶ Risk

- Postpones the inevitable?
- What happens with product synergy, new products
- If truly separate, why do the merger

Integration choices

2. Four groups based on customer segment and channel

- Enterprise = V only, named accounts
- Midrange = V+ S in teams (Pod approach), mostly fulfilled through 2-tier channel
- 2 Tier Distribution = S only
- OEM = V only

▶ Opportunity

- Sell all products to all customers
- Allocate sales resources via customer group
- Keep distribution sales force intact, reduce risk in that area

▶ Risk

- Big Bang reorganization
- Channel conflict between enterprise and mid and small
- Team quotas not part of V culture

Integration choices

3. Optimize on successful Seagate integration

- Enterprise = $\frac{3}{4} V + \frac{1}{4} S$ (silent on named accounts), high comp, high risk territories
- Midrange = $\frac{1}{2} V + \frac{1}{2} S$, individual territories / quotas, medium comp, medium risk territories.
- 2 Tier Distribution = S only
- (OEM = V + S) silent on this point

▶ Opportunity

- Blends Seagate and Veritas sales forces
- Can change more from here

▶ Risk

- The hybrid portion has all the problems of big bang above
- Channel conflict as enterprise and mid buy like a small company
- What do the sales reps at small do? Is it economic without mid?

Integration choices

4. Hire the best and maintain Veritas sales culture

- ▶ Opportunity
 - Cleanest cultural win
 - Cleanest structure
- ▶ Risk
 - Could destroy Seagate asset

Integration Considerations

- What timing would you recommend and why?
 - ▶ Immediate
 - ▶ Next year
 - ▶ Never
- What are the benefits of merging sales forces?
 - ▶ Coherent presentation to customers
 - ▶ Ability to leverage sales reps selling time (multiple products)
 - ▶ More cost efficient
 - ▶ As product lines merge, single sales force is mandatory
- What are the risks?
 - ▶ Lots of unhappy reps and managers
 - ▶ Loss of good people
 - ▶ Confusion in sales force
 - ▶ Confusion at customers
 - ▶ Opportunities for competitors
 - ▶ Loss of momentum
- Do the risks / benefits change relative to the timing of the merger?

If it were easy...

- “Merger of Equals” are always considered risky. Why?
 - ▶ Rarely able to make it seem “equal afterwards”
 - ▶ Always jockeying for positions
 - ▶ As the organization settles out, the unequalness becomes visible
 - ▶ “A collision of two garbage trucks.”
- How will competitors view this deal?
 - ▶ Competitors at high end (LegatoCA, HP, IBM) and low end (Cheyenne) will try to convince market this is bad for their segment – loss of focus, channel conflict, etc.
 - ▶ Competitors will try to poach best people (sales, engineers, etc.)
 - ▶ Competitors may try to combine to create competitive end-to-end offering
- Communication THE most significant management responsibility
 - ▶ Roles and process
 - ▶ Strategy and goals
 - ▶ Values and behaviors

The Sallaberry Plan

- Direct: 1/2 Veritas direct reps to go after named accounts
- General Commercial (GC): Fulfill through the channel, with remaining Veritas and Seagate reps
- OEM: Fold Seagate reps into Veritas OEM group

Compensation before

- Expense: (\$47.8M)
 - ▶ Veritas: 137 reps * 200k (OTE) = \$27.4M
 - ▶ Seagate: 120 reps * 170k (OTE) = \$20.4M
- Rep productivity (\$410M total)
 - ▶ V: \$210M (revenue) / 137 = \$1.5M/rep
 - ▶ S: \$199M (revenue) / 120 = \$1.7M/rep
- 30 mid-level managers
 - ▶ Remove 12 -> (move from 4->7 reports)
 - ▶ Move/replace to quota carrying reps

After (Sallaberry Plan)

- Direct: $\frac{1}{2} 125 = 63$ named account reps
- General Commercial (GC): 194
 - ▶ $194 - 12$ (mid-managers) = 172
- Make OTE \$200k for everyone
- Increase named account quota by 20%
 - ▶ \$1.5M -> \$1.8M
- Increase GC/channel quota by 30%
 - ▶ 1.66M -> \$2.1M

Expected Results

- Productivity
 - ▶ Named accts: $63 \text{ reps} * \$1.8\text{M} = \113M
 - ▶ GC: $194 * \$2.1\text{M} = \407M
 - ▶ Total net revenue = \$520M from \$410 (27% increase)
- Expense
 - ▶ $63 * 200\text{k} = \$12.6\text{M}$
 - ▶ $194 * 200\text{k} = \$39\text{M}$
 - ▶ $257 * 200\text{k} = \$51\text{M}$
- Increase expense by \$3.6M, revenue by \$110M

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15.387 Entrepreneurial Sales
Spring 2015

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