Epistemically necessary = knowable a priori.   Metaphysically necessary = true in every possible world.
They come apart! 'This animal is a dog' is metaphysically necessary but epistemically contingent.
'Jack the Ripper, if he exists, is a murderer' is epistemically necessary but metaphysically contingent.

Kripke's Objections to Russell's Name Claim. ('n' means 'the F').   If 'n' means 'the F', then

> (*) 'a thing is n iff it is the F'

should be (i) metaphysically necessary, (ii) a priori.

1. <u>(*) is not necessary left to right; F is not metaphysically necessary for being n</u>
   'It could have happened that Twain was an illiterate tramp.' True. 'It could have happened that the author of such and such books was an illiterate tramp.' False.

2. <u>(*) is not necessary right to left; F is not metaphysically sufficient for being n</u>
   'Necessarily Bertrand Russell descended from Lord John Russell.' True. 'Necessarily the most famous 20th Century British philosopher descended from Lord Russell.' False.

3. <u>(*) is not a priori left to right; F is not epistemically necessary for being n</u>
   Say 'Gödel' means *the man who proved that arithmetic is incomplete* 'Gödel was a mathematician' should be a priori. And it's not; we can imagine discovering he was an impostor.

4. <u>(*) is not a priori right to left; F is not epistemically sufficient for being n</u>
   Suppose it turns out that the man known as Gödel in fact stole the proof from Schmidt. Does that mean 'Gödel' really refers to Schmidt?

Replies (?). To 1. The description gets wide scope. Or, it's 'the *actual* author of such and such books.'
To 2. Same. 'As for the most famous philosopher, *he* is necessarily descended from Lord Russell.'
To 3. You've chosen the wrong description. Maybe it's 'the guy originally dubbed 'Gödel'.'
To 4. Same. It's not a priori that the guy originally dubbed 'Gödel' was a mathematician.

Another way to put objections 1 and 2: Definite descriptions are not *rigid*; they pick out different objects in different possible worlds. Names are rigid.

Rigidity Test: Term T is non-rigid if *T might not have been* T.

'The author of Huck Finn might not have been the author of Huck Finn.'   TRUE.
'Mark Twain might not have been Mark Twain.' FALSE.

Note, however, even if non-rigid terms are descriptions rather than names, that doesn't mean names can't be descriptions; for some descriptions are rigid. Examples? Does this help?

Suppose Kripke is right that names are not equivalent to descriptions – not even "rigidified" descriptions. Two issues this leaves us with, one semantic and one meta-semantic.

<u>Semantic Question</u>: What do names mean? What do they contribute to sentence meaning?
Direct Reference Theory: Their referents = what they refer to.

<u>Meta-Semantic Question</u>: In virtue of what does a name have that particular meaning?
Causal/Historical "Picture": 'n' means x because x was initially "baptized" 'n', and the name was 'passed from link to link' with each learner intending to use 'n' with the same meaning as before.

Hold on, though! The direct reference theory is the one Frege was recoiling from in the first place! It runs straight into our four puzzles.

Informative identity: 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' comes out necessary and perhaps even a priori! Because it says just that $x = x$.

Non-Referring ("Empty") Names: 'Vulcan' and 'Santa Claus' come out devoid of meaning.

Non-Existence Claims: 'Santa Claus has never existed' comes out false or unevaluable.

Attitude Attributions: Hammurabi did too believe that Hesperus = Phosphorus.

Simplest strategy is to concede the seemingly counterintuitive results of DR, but deny they're counterintuitive. They seem so because we confuse what a sentence literally says with speakers typically convey by uttering it. What we convey with 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is non-trivial; the literal content is trivial. What we convey with 'Santa Claus has never existed' is true; there is no literal content to speak of.

Look at attitude attributions. Simple DR theorists make a negative move and a positive move. Negatively they say that names *are* sometimes used transparently. 'If Alma wants to meet Samuel Clemens, then she wants to meet Mark Twain, whether she knows it or not.' 'Columbus thought Castro's island was in the far east.' 'The police think Jacques dropped the dice as he escaped.'

But why is the opaque reading so much more natural? This is the puzzle; more later.

Turn now to Kripke's meta-semantic view, the causal/historical "picture."   'Someone, let's say a baby, is born... The baby's parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say, Richard Feynman, may be referring to Feynman even though he can't remember from whom he first heard of Feynman...A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker He then is referring to Feynman even though he can't identify him uniquely.'

Why does Kripke call it a picture as opposed to a theory? To avoid counterexamples? Or because the theory itself relies on intentions to *refer* to the same person, so as an account of reference it would be circular?

Puzzles: (1) Naming one thing after another. My son is Isaac but the name traces back to my grandfather (and further). (2) 'Santa Claus' traces back to a historical saint, but we aren't unwittingly referring to the saint. 'Dracula' too. Why doesn't 'Santa Claus' work like 'Jonah'? (3) Empty names. (4) Reference can drift even though everyone means to be referring to the same thing as their teacher. 'Madagascar' refers to the island only because of a mistake made by Marco Polo. (5) People can lose sight even of the *type* of thing referred to. King Arthur's son Anir "whom legend has perhaps confused with his burial place." Kripke's Nancy example. (6) Fictional names.

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